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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
MINNESOTA PLEADING AS "FACT PLEADING"
By G. W C. Ross*
DENIALS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSESM INNESOTA pleading is called "fact pleading."' This is ex-
pressed by the maxim that "the facts" and not "conclusions
of law" are to be pleaded. 2 A "fact" in this connection seems
generally to mean an event-something that took place. Not al-
ways, for instance, the allegation that certain goods were "of
the actual and reasonable value of" so many dollars is undoubt-
edly a good allegation of "fact," yet it is hardly the statement of
an event that happened. Rather, it states simply an existing con-
dition of things. But more commonly the distinction between
"fact" and "conclusion of law" seems to have in mind the "facts"
as events, as distinguished from the legal rights and obligations to
which the stated events gave rise. An "operative" or "issuable
fact" means substantially an event which created a legal right or
obligation, or changed somebody's rights or obligations. So to
"plead the facts" means virtually, to state simply that certain spe-
cified events occurred. The law's "method of creating rights is
to provide that upon the happening of a certain event a right shall
accrue. The law annexes to the event a certain consequence,
namely, the creation of a legal right. The creation of a right is
therefore conditioned upon the happening of an event.""
This is considered a primary, basic principle of code plead-
ing Yet we find it urged, that pragmatically applied, the theory
develops no consistent, defined meaning. One of the practical.
problems of pleading involving and testing the general concep-
tion is the drawing of the distinction between denials and affirma-
tive defenses. What is the scope of proof admissible under an
answer (or reply) by way of denial, and what is "new mat-
ter "" to be specially and affirmatively pleaded? From that point
of view this examination of our Minnesota cases is undertaken.
*Professor, St. Thomas College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
'Clark, Code Pleading 19, 150 et seq. Cf. Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9250
(2), Dunnell, Minn. Pleading, 2nd ed., sec. 249.
2And of course, the "ultimate facts" and not "evidentiary facts" are
to be pleaded. But that side of the general problem is outside the purview
of this paper.
sj. H. Beale. Summary of the Conflict of Laws, sec. 2, at the end of
Vol. III of his Cases on the Conflict of Laws (1902 Ed.).
'Cf. Pomeroy- Code Remedies, 4th ed., 560, 561.5Minn. G. S. 1923, sec 9253 (2).
MINNESOTA PLEADING AS "FACT PLEADING" 349
Our earliest leading case seems to be Finicy v. Quirk,G an ac-
tion for breach of warranty in the sale of a horse. The answer
admitted the sale but denied the warranty. The testimony at the
trial 'incidentally disclosed the fact that the sale had been con-
summated on Sunday; whereupon defendant moved for judgment,
for the illegality of a Sunday sale. The motion was denied, and
on appeal a verdict for the plaintiff was sustained. The court
said the sale was illegal, but this was an affirmative defense, not
available under the denial. Since the complaint alleged only that
the warranty was given, the denial denied only that that event
took place. If the warranty was actually given, but by reason
of the further fact that it was given on Sunday it did not create
the seller's legally enforceable obligation to make it good, such
further fact is matter of affirmative defense.
7
But a counter-argument suggests itself here. A "warranty,"
like the "sale" of which it is part, is a "contract", and a "con-
tract," it is urged, (and a "warranty" or a "sale")means a legally
binding and valid agreement." Hence, a complaint alleging that
the parties "made and entered into" a stated "contract" alleges
that they made a legally binding, enforceable agreement. If for
any reason, as, e.g., that it was made on Sunday, it was not such
a valid, legally obligatory agreement, then the parties did not
make a contract at all. Therefore a denial that the parties made
the contract should admit proof of anything to show that they
did not make such a binding, enforceable agreement. This posi-
tion gets color of cogency from the common law maxim, which
the code is said to have inherited, that facts may be pleaded "ac-
cording to their legal effect."9  As applied to such allegations as
these here considered, it is submitted that this maxim might be
more happily stated by saying, that acts may be alleged according
to the meaning and intention of the actors in performing them.
To allege that plaintiff "sold" certain goods to defendant un-
6(1864) 9 Minn. 194.7At the end of the opinion the court remarks that the answer admit-
ted the sale, and intimate that that admission may have narrowed the
scope of the dental of the warranty. But that is not the main basis or
course of reasoning of the opinion.8Is this necesarily true? Must the word, "contract" be taken to mean
morL- than the word "bargain," i.e., an -agreement by which each party
gives a quid pro quo? Should the fundamental question of pleading here-
inafter discussed be made to turn upon whether the allegation is, that the
parties "made a contract," or, aliter, that they "made a bargain" (or, agree-
ment," on a consideration stated)?9Dunnell, Minn. Pleading 2nd ed., secs. 211, 217, Clark, Code Plead-
ing 161.
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doubtedly alleges more than bare physical facts. Every human
act initiated by human will comprises mental as well as physical
ingredients and aspects. The allegation is, that the parties physi-
cally did and said the things that they did do and say with the
meaning and intention of transferring the (ownership of the)
goods to defendant in exchange for a payment or a promise by
him. Whether they accomplished their intention in its full legal
result is another matter. That is the conclusion of law, which
by the very fundamental philosophy of "fact pleading" is to be
kept out of the pleadings. To import the full conclusion of law
into such allegations breaks down the possibility of "fact plead-
ing" at all. It is not a practical possibility to state the voluntary
acts of human beings without using such words as "sold," "pur-
chased," "made a contract" and the like. Such expressions are
mere necessary conciseness of diction. If the allegation that par-
ties "made a contract" means more than that they did actually
make a bargain, intentionally pledging their faith to each other-
if, beyond that, it means that they made such a bargain as did
create a full, legally valid obligation, then "fact pleading" is
abandoned at its threshold.1'
Our first case of Finley v. Quirk at any rate sanctions no
such doctrine. It applies logically the fundamental theory of
"fact pleading" as first outlined. From a little different angle the
case of Register Prntig Co. v Willis" illustrates the same gen-
eral principle. That was an action for the reasonable value of print-
ing work done. The answer was a general denial. At the trial
defendant proved an expressly agreed price, less than the sum
plaintiff had proved to be the reasonable value of the work, and
thereupon moved for dismissal. But the motion was denied, and
'
0 The point here made is carefully worked out in the case of Christian-
son v. Chicago, etc., Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 249, 63 N. W 639. In that, a
personal injury action, defendant pleaded settlement and release; reply,
general denial. Plaintiff was held entitled to prove, that while he did
sign a paper on its face a release, he did so only under deception as to
its nature and terms. He had not knowingly, intentionally released his claim.
But Chief Justice Start takes pains to point out that this ordinance is
admissible under the denial because it does actually deny tho act alleged,
and that if plaintiff had actually and intentionally released his claim, but
had been induced to do so by some collateral fraud-e.g., as to the diagnosis
or prognosis of his injury-that would have been affirmative matter re-
quiring special pleading in the reply. The allegation that plaintiff had
released his claim did not involve the conclusion of law, that the release
was valid and binding; it merely summed up the (alleged) mental as well
as physical action of the party. Cf. ac: Hanson v. Diamond Iron Mining
Co., (1902) 87 Minn. 505, 507; 92 N. W 447
11(1894) 57 Minn. 93, 58 N. W 825.
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on appeal findings for the plaintiff were sustained, the court hold-
ing the evidence of the agreed price not admissible under the
general denial. The complaint had alleged only- (a) that the
work was done, (b) at defendant's request; and (c) its reason-
able value. Defendant's proof did not contradict any one of these
three facts, but sought to show that by reason of a further fact,
to-wit, the agreed price, plaintiff was not legally entitled to re-
cover the reasonable value of the work; and that, the court held,
is dearly "new matter" of affirmative defense.1 2
It is not surprising to find perhaps our clearest statement of
this doctrine by Mr. Justice Mitchell. In the case of Dodge v.
McMahon'3 a grain broker sued for money advanced to protect
defendant's margins on a trade in futures. Under a general de-
nial defendant at the trial offered to prove that the trade was a
gambling transaction, but the evidence was excluded and on ap-
peal decision for the plaintiff was affirmed, defendant's proof be-
ing held inadmissible under his answer. After mentioning some
contrary intimations Mr. Justice Mitchell says
"The correct rule is that under a denial the detendant is at
liberty to give only such evidence as tends to disprove the ex-
utence of the facts, as facts, alleged by the plaintiff, but not of
any matter aliunde, which, although admitting such facts, would
tend to avoid their legal effect and operation."' 4
This case has been cited and followed repeatedly Thus, m
Andrus v. Dyckman Hotel Co.,"5 a defendant, sued for rent under
a lease, was not allowed under a general denial to show that the
lease was invalid because made in contemplation of unlawful
selling.1 8
12Accord: Reishus-Remer Land Co. v. Benner, (1920) 91 Minn. 401,
98 N. W. 186.-In the principal case defendant's motion to dismiss was
based on the technical ground that in an action quantum mcrit the plain-
tiff is not entitled to recover at all if a definite price was expressly agreed
on. That precise proposition is not law in Minnesota since the case of
Meyer v. Saterbak, (1915) 128 Minn. 304, 150 N. IV 901, but it was
believed to be the orthodox Minnesota doctrine at the time of the principal
case. Defendant's appeal failed, not because he was wrong on that propo-
sition, but, as stated in the text, because under his answer lie was held
not entitled to raise the point
-3(1895) 61 Minn. 175, 63 N. W 487.
14(1895) 61 Minn. 175, 177 63 N. W 487. Italics the author's.
15(1914) 126 Minn. 417, 421, 148 N. W 566.
16Cf. Start, C. J., in Christianson v. Chicago, etc. Ry., (1895) 61
Minn. 249, 252, 63 N.W 639, (see note 10, supra), that it is "the general
rule of pleading that under a general denial no fact can be given in
evidence which does not go directly to disprove the act alleged by the
opposite party; that matters which admit the act, but avoid ii. effect, or
discharge tHe obligation, cannot be given in evidence under the general
denial." (Italics, the author's). Cf. ac: Woodbridge v. Sellwood, (1896)
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These cases make a consistent body of authority applying
with reasonable strictness and accuracy the primary philosophy of
"fact pleading." Meantime, however, our court had decided the
case of Handy v St. Paul Globe Co.17 Handy sued for having
been wrongfully discharged in violation of a five-year contract
employing him as advertising manager of the newspaper. The
answer denied the contract. At the trial plaintiff offered in evi-
dence his written contract of employment, which on inspection in-
cluded the daily and Sunday paper, and thereupon, on objection,
it was excluded. This contract being the foundation of plaintiff's
case, defendant of course got a verdict, and on appeal it was sus-
tained. The court held the contract illegal, and though no such
defense had been pleaded, yet since plaintiff's own evidence
showed the illegality, defendant could exclude that evidence and
so shut the plaintiff out of court. Mr. Justice Gilfillan, for the
court, explained that while it is "sometimes necessary to plead
the facts on which illegality depends, it is never necessary to
plead the law
"When the facts appear, either upon the pleadings or proofs,
either party may insist upon the law applicable to such facts. In
this case plaintiff had, under the pleadings, to prove the contract
upon which he suedI. If it be void on its face he, not defendant,
showed its illegality "18
This appears to mean, that if plaintiff could have got his contract
in evidence without disclosing its relation to a Sunday newspaper,
defendant under his answer could not by evidence from his side
have shown that relation. That would have been matter of affirm-
ative defense. But since plaintiff's own evidence established the
defense, defendant could avail himself of it, though not pleaded.
That is not easy to reconcile with our first case of Finley v.
Quirk,19 which also involved a Sunday transaction, and where
that fact had come to light in the course of plaintiff's proof of
his main case. 20  Nor at first blush is it easy to reconcile with
the familiar rule that an item of evidence properly admitted for
one purpose does not thereby become available to the other side
65 Minn. 135, 67 N. W 799; Van Dusen-Harrington Co. v. Jungeblut,
(1899) 75 Minn. 298, 301, 77 N. W 970; Banner Grain Co. v. Burr
Farmers Elevator Co., (1925) 162 Minn. 334, 202 N. W 740.
17(1899) 41 Minn. 188, 42 N. W 872.
12(1889) 41 Minn. 188, 190, 42 N. W 872.
19(1864) 9 Minn. 194.
20The opinion (page 199) says it appeared "in the examination of
plaintiff's witness ;"-whether on direct or on cross examination, is not
stated.
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for other purposes not in issue. 2  However, it is of course true,
that not only must evidence be competent to prove the fact it is
offered to prove, but that fact, which it is sought to prove by the
evidence, must be an "operative" fact. And the trouble with
Handy's written document was that it did not prove an "opera-
tive" fact, for an illegal contract is not an operative fact, i.e., it
gives rise to no rights or obligations.
But in recent cases our court has gone further and ex-
plained that "illegality" is more than a mere defense. If it
amounts to positive immorality, or, perhaps, to violation of a
statutory prohibition, then such illegality will defeat the action
regardless. of the pleadings and whenever and however it may ap-
pear. The first case distinctly to enounce this rule seems to be
Goodrtch v. Northwestern Telephone Co.22  That was an action
to recover money the defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiffs.
In the course of the litigation it transpired that the consideration
moving from the plaintiffs had been their illegal undertaking to
use their mfluence and position as citizens and as public officials
to help the company stifle competition. Although no such de-
fense had been pleaded, the plaintiffs were denied recovery. Ap-
parently the written contract did not disclose the illegality on its
face, as Handy's contract did, but that was not deemed important.
It is not even needful, in the court's view, that the defendant shall
urge or seek to take advantage of the defense at all, the court of
its own motion will refuse recovery. Says Chief Justice Wilson,
for the court :23
"The defense is not allowed for the sake of the defendant,
but of the law itself. Whenever the illegality appears, whether
the evidence comes from one side or the other, the disclosure is
fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can neutralize its
effect. A stipulation in the most solemn form to waive the objec-
tion would be void for the same reasons." 2'
21Cf. Lautenschlager v. Hunter, (1875) 22 Minn. 267
22(1924) 161 Minn. 106, 201 N. W 290.
23Quoting with approval from the case of Oscanyan v. Arms Co..
(1880) 103 U. S. 261, 268, 26 L. Ed. 539.24Goodrich v. Northwestern Tel. Co., (1924) 161 Minn. 106, 112, 201
N.W 290. Cf. Stone, J., in Bosshard v. County of Steele, (dissentiente),
(1927) 173 Minn. 283, 286, 217 N.W 354 "The proposition is not, in
the final analysis, that illegality is a defense. It is rather the simple
refusal of the law to rescue its violators from the consequences of their
own wrong. Whenever and however illegality appears to the court its
duty is to stop the inquiry, leave the parties where they are and decline to
assist either. 1. The rule applies, of course, only whzie the parties are
-in part delicto" (Italics, the author's.) But this case did not raise
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This removes "illegality" from any relationship to the law of
pleading and manifestly raises a considerable exception to our
general principle. It is only an exception, it may be noted, this
new doctrine does not purport to abandon the whole theory of
"fact pleading" as already set out, except where an "illegality"
comes into view But how large an exception is involved I What
sorts of facts will constitute such "illegality," and what will be
mere defenses, morally colorless and waived unless specially
pleaded? According to Justice Stone's dictum, 25 the rule of "ille-
gality" applies only where the parties are in pan delicto. This, per-
haps, was intended to explain the fact that such defenses as usury20
and fraud are not treated on this basis. Our court has repeatedly
said that fraud-not in esse contractus, but affecting only the in-
ducement or consideration-is generally an affirmative defense,
waived unless specially pleaded.2 7 But in the late case of Kampfer
z Peterman,2 1 the fact that a realtor had been secretly employed
and paid by the seller defeated his action for a commission prom-
ised him bv the buyer, although the buyer had pleaded no such de-
fense but had merely denied his own agreement to pay the com-
mission. It goes without saying that these parties were not in part
delicto. The defendent, however, was the innocent party to the
situation, but on that basis fraud, it would seem, should be simi-
larly treated in favor of a defrauded defendent, but as already
noted, it has not been. If Kampfer v. Peternian is to be taken as
our considered and settled law, the attempt to apply the doctrine
of "illegality" on the basis of the maxim about parties in part
delicto seems to break down.
Professor Clark suggests the applicability of some scale of moral
values ;29 but any attempt so to line up all our actual Minnesota
the question of pleading, for the illegality was specially pleaded as an
affirmative defense.
25Supra, note 24.
2GAdamson v. Wiggins, (1891) 45 Minn. 448, 449, 48 N. W 185,
(semble).27Christianson v. Chicago, etc., Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 249, 251, 252,
63 N. W 639- Trainer v. Schutz, (1906) 98 Minn. 213, 218, 107 N. W
812 Marshall-Wells Hdw. Co. v. Emde, (1913) 121 Minn. 514, 140 N. W
1027
28(1926) 166 Minn. 306, 207 N. W 633.20Clark, Code Pleading 423 "Illegality, where not so great as to
shock the conscience of the court, ordinarily must be affirm-
atively pleaded. In the case of 'inherent illegality' so great as to vitiate
the entire transaction, the matter may be raised by a denial, or the court
may, whenever it is brought to its attention, dismiss the case summarily"
(Italics, the author's.)
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decisions is plainly hopeless.3 0 It must probably be assumed that
the Goodrich Case and the later cases following it have overruled
the earlier cases to this extent; but this leaves the boundaries of
the "illegality" rule still undefined.3 '
Can a key to the solution be obtained by considering from an-
other point of view the nature of such defenses as fraud, or in-
fancy' It is learnmg that needs no citation, that a contract be-
tween an adult and an infant is not "void" but is only "voidable,"
which means, that it binds the adult and is enforceable against him,
but is not binding or enforceable against the infant. To be sure,
the infant's defense, looking at the situation solely from his side,
does not at first seem stu generis. While his promise is executory
his defense, at least in Minnesota, is virtually absolute and is
available "at law," unconditionally.32 But the fact remains that
the transaction was an "operative fact ;" it did affect rights and
obligations. The same is true of a transaction induced by fraud.
Against the defrauder it is valid and binding; only at the option
of the defrauded party is it "voidable." Now can we say, that
the distinction between "illegality" that is available independently
of the pleadings, and waivable affirmative defenses, follows the
line of tis distinction between transactions "void" and "void-
able?" Does this suggestion, or does it not, come back substan-
tially to Mr. Justice Stone's dictum about the maxim in pan
delicto' Will it explain and justify the case of Kampfer v. Peter-
3OThus, the sale of one's civic influence and position to help a public
utility stifle competition, Goodrich v. Northwestern Tel. Co., (1924) 161
Minn. 106, 201 N. W 290; secret receipt of a commission from both sides,
by a broker, Kampfer v. Peterman, (1926) 166 Minn. 306, 207 N. W 633;
and perhaps, Sunday desecration, Handy v. St. Paul Globe Co., (1889)
41 Minn. 188, 42 N. W 872; would be "shocking" illegality; while
gambling, Dodge v. McMahon, (1895) 61 Minn. 175, 63 N. W 487 and
note 16; fraud, Christianson v. Chicago, etc., Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 249,
251, 252, 63 N. W 639; Trainer v. Schutz, (1906) 98 Minn. 213, 218, 107
N. W 812; Marshall-Wells Hdw. Co. v. Emde, (1913) 121 Minn. 524,
140 N. W 1027, usury, Adamson v. Wiggins, (1891) 45 Minn. 448, 48
N. W 185; bootlegging, Andrus v. Dyckman Hotel Co., (1914) 126 Minn.
41, 148-N. W 566, and perhaps, Sunday desecration, Finley v. Quirk,
(1864) 9 Minn. 194, would not be!
aN. B., that the case of Banner Grain Co. v. Burr Farmers Elevator
Co., (1925) 162 Minn. 334, 202 N. W 740, (see note 16, supra) where
gambling was held a (waivable) affirmative defense, is later than the
Goodrich case, (1924) 161 Minn. 106, 201 N. W 290, and is cited with
approval in the still later case of Trovatten v. Hanson, (1927) 171
Minn. 130, 132, 213 N. W 536. In gambling cases too, the parties of
course are in pan delicto.
i2Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Ufe" Ins. Co., (1894) 56 Minn. 365,
374, 59 N. W 992.
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man.3 3  It would seem that here is something our court might
well take the first occasion to put in clearer light.
Another exception to the logic of "fact pleading," well es-
tablished in our decisions, is the permission to an ejectment or
replevin plaintiff to "plead his title generally," i.e., to allege simply
that "plaintiff owns" the property in question.3 4  That allegation
does not state any fact (event) whatever. It is a mere conclu-
sion of law, since title to property is nothing but a legal right-
more accurately, a "bundle of legal rights."35 The cases that set-
tled this rule for Minnesota 6 do not seem to have recognized its
anamalous character, though elsewhere our court impliedly has
done so. Thus, in Minnesota if a pleader says simply that "plain-
tiff owns" described property, that is held a good allegation of
"fact." But if he first says that on a given past date "John Doe
owned" the property, and then proceeds at once to say that "plain-
tiff is now the owner" thereof, that second statement is held bad
as conclusion of law 11 It is so, indeed, and the court perceives
the reason, to-wit, that the pleading fails to state any conveyance
by John Doe, that is, it states no event whose occurrence has
changed the initial legal situation. But of course the statement
that "plaintiff is now the owner of" the property is no more a
83 Kampfer v. Peterman, (1926) 166 Minn. 306, 207 N. W 633.34Atwater v. Spalding, (1902) 86 Minn. 101, 90 N. W 370; and
cases there cited.3 5Professor Cook's penetrating article on "Statements of Fact il
Code Pleading" (21 Col. L. Rev. 416) seems criticizable at this point.
He says (p. 419) "Consider the statement in a pleading, that 'defendant
owes plaintiff $500.' It is the conclusion of a logical argument" (to-wit)
"Whenever certain facts, a, b, c, etc., exist, B (defendant) owes A
(plaintiff) $500- facts a, b, c, etc., exist, therefore B owes A $500. This
being so, whenever the bare statement is made that 'B owes A $500,' we
may if we wish regard it as a statement in generic form that all the facts
necessary to create the legal duty described by the word 'owe' arc
true as between A and B." This might do if "facts a, b, c, etc.," were al-
ways similar facts-if only one sort or sequence of facts (events) could
create the legal duty which we call a debt. But that is far from true. A
debt may arise, e. g., from a sale of goods, from performance of service,
from a wide variety of events and circumstances. Hence the bare state-
ment that "B owes A" does not in any sense state what events have oc
curred. It tells us only that the legal duty exists, by virtue of what sort of
events, the reader is left to guess in the dark. The same considerations
apply to the general allegation of title. The distinction may be "one of
degree only" (Clark, Code Pleading 155) but so is the distinction be-
tween 30 Fahrenheit and 35 Fahrenheit merely a matter of 5 degrees but
it crosses the critical freezing point. Mr. Justice Holmes truly opined, in
Haddock v. Haddock (diss. 201 U. S. 562, Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867) that
"most distinctions" are matters of degree, "and are none the worse for it."3 6Atwater v. Spalding, (1902) 86 Minn. 101, 90 N. W 370.3 7Topping v. Clay, (1895) 62 Minn. 3, 63 N. W 1038.
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conclusion of law than the opening statement that on the past
date "John Doe owned" it. Neither does that allegation state any
event which made Doe the owner. The rule allowing one to plead
title generally may be justified on grounds of necessary conven-
ience. It would often be impossible to trace the title to a chattel
back to its original producer; and if every real estate title had to
be specifically deraigned step by step, from the government patent
down, the-pleadings would be intolerably long. But it should not
be overlooked that the rule is an exception to every logical prn-
ciple of "fact pleading." Hence, for instance, the effect of this
-general pleading of title in widening inordinately the scope of the
general denial is likewise to be recognized as a peculiar result of
the anomalous character of the allegation denied."
It is thus seen, that while Minnesota has not repudiated the
essential philosophy of "fact pleading"--indeed, one of the very
latest cases in terms re-affirms it3 -- yet its practical application
has been considerably whittled down in at least two directions.
Our reports contain scattered diqta looking still further and in-
timating that almost the whole distinction here contended for,
between denials and affirmative defenses, should be deemed out-
moded. In Hodgson v. Mather"n Mr. Justice Lovely, for the
court, criticizes our first case of Finley v. Quirk." "The court
below," he says "may have been misled by the limitations upon
the scope of the general demal in" that case. "But we have in
cases of a more recent date given a wider and broader scope to
the general denial than formerly, in consonance with modern en-
larged views of pleading."' 2 This does not refer to the fact that
the defense in Finley v. Qutrk was perhaps a matter of "illegality"
as since defined, it is intended as a criticism of the whole theory
of pleading relied on by the court in that case. But it is dictum,
no such criticism of Finley v. Quirk has any application or point
in Hodgson v. Mather4' The allegation there was that a note
had been "duly assigned and transferred to" the plaintiff. Un-
der-general denial, defendant was held entitled to show that the
transfer was after maturity In other words, the allegation that
38Cf. Commonwealth Co. v. Dokko, (1898) 72 Minn. 229. 75 N. W
106- Adamson v. Wiggins, (1891) 45 Minn. 448. 449. 48 N. W 185" Johnson
v. Osuald, (1888) 38 Minn. 550, 552, 38 N. W 630.
39Gjesdahl v. Hanson, (Minn. 1928) 221 N. W 639.40(1904)' 92 Minn. 299, 100 N. W 87
4"Finley v. Quirk, (1864) 9 Minn. 194.
42Hodgson v. Mather, (1904) 92 Minn. 299, 300, 100 N. W 87
43Hodgson v. Mather, (1904) 92 Minn. 299, 100 N. W 87.
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the note was "duly assigned" is held to mean that it was assigned
betore maturity ("in the due course of business"), hence, denial
that it was "duly assigned" admits proof that it was assigned after
maturity Mr. Justice Lovely expresses this by saying that "the
specific averments set forth in the complaint and all inferences of
fact implied by law therefrom are as fully put in issue by"
[the general denial] "as if what is inferred by law from the general
statements therein had been specifically set forth and specifically
denied."44' As applied to the facts in Hodgson v. Mather, this
seems hardly a matter of "inference." It seems rather a case of
synonymous terms. Justice Lovely's doctrine of "inferences," in-
deed, seems hardly borne out by our authorities. An allegation that
on a consideration stated defendant promised to pay a certain sum
of money, means, without more, that the promise was to pay "on
demand;" which in our law means immediately and without any
demand. So a complaint alleging such a promise, with no maturity
stated, is not demurrable, because the promise is presumptively
("inferentially") a promise to pay at once. 41 From this, Justice
Lovely might well urge that a defendant denying a promise so al-
leged ought to be allowed to prove that the promise really made was
to pay at a future date, not yet arrived. But that does not seem
to be so. If defendant wishes to show that a term of credit was
given, not yet expired, that appears to be held matter of affirma-
tive defense.
46
Again, in the case of Hanson v. Marion7 the court says that
a general denial "squarely presented the issue whether a valid
contract was entered into."48  But that statement goes far be-
yond any requirements of the case, and is not accurate even as
applied to the case itself. It was a question of the statute of
frauds, and the court applies and extends the rule that where the
complaint alleges the contract generally (i.e., without disclosing
whether it was written or oral) defendant under denial may shut
out plaintiff's evidence of an oral contract. They hold further
in this case, that defendant may admit the proof without objec-
tion and still move for a directed verdict, apparently on the ground
that plaintiff's evidence has proved nothing-no "operative
44Hodgson v. Mather, (1904) 92 Minn. 299, 300, 100 N. W 87 Italics
the authors.45Chamberlain v. Tiner, (1884) 31 Minn, 371, 18 N. W 143.
46Iselin v. Simon, (1895) 62 Minn. 128, 64 N. W 143.
47(1915) 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W 195.
4sHanson v. Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468. 473, 151 N. W 195.
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fact."4  But they recognize in the same opinion, that if the com-
:plaint disclosed the "character of the contract" (as written or
oral) "defendant must either demur thereto or plead the Statute
in his answer" (i.e., affirmatively), "otherwise there is a waiver.""io
This of course could hardly be true if a denial presented the
broad issue of validity.
The reader is by this time highly impatient at all this "logic-
chopping." "What difference does it make," he can be heard
exclaiming- "Let all the facts be shown !" But it needs to be
remembered that every extension of the scope of the denial by just
so much impairs the value of the pleadings, either as defining the
issues or as giving notice to the adversary and the court, of the
lines of proof that are to be anticipated and prepared for. From
this point of view the wisdom of the modern rule of "illegality"
may well be doubted. Certainly it goes far enough in breaking
(town the utility of the pleadings and enabling defendant to play
a blind hand. But the dicta last considered, on their face, would
all but abolish affirmative defenses. Not quite, facts which oc-
curred since the original transaction took place would still be
"new matter "' for instance, payment, accord and satisfaction,
release. But any and all facts entering into the original transac-
tion and which for any reason rendered it defensible ab initio
would be admissible under a denial that the transaction took place.
It is submitted it were hardly worth while to retain the answer
at all merely for the purpose of pleading defenses that have
arisen since the original transaction, such as payment and release.
Let the pleadings stop with the complaint and let defendant prove
anything that will defeat recovery under it-just as we do now
stop with the reply, and let defendant prove anything and every-
thing to defeat its effect, whether by contradiction or by confes-
sion and avoidance, and without any pleading by way of rejoinder
This of course would simply abandon any attempt to make the
49Sed quaere. The court relies on the fact that our statute of frauds
says the contract "shall be void," not simply, that defendant "shall not be
charged." But a complaint that alleges only a truly non-operative fact
will not support a judgment. No judgment could rightfully be entered.
for instance, on a complaint that alleged simply that defendant "is six
feet tall Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment for $500." Even
a default judgment, if entered on such complaint. would be erroneous
and reversible on appeal. But if a complaint alleges an oral contract
to convey land, and defendant defaults, judgment is properly entered for
the plaintiff and is not reversible on appeal, as the opinion in the principal
case immediately recognizes.
5OHanson v. Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468, 473, 151 N. W 195.
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parties sift their case and define what is in dispute, for each other
or for the court. Undoubtedly the liberal allowance of amend-
ments before and during and even after the trial tends power-
fully to break down the whole system of pleading. Small use
spending time and labor to define the issues unless the parties
are going to be held to the issues defined I It is suggested that
the need of giving "fair notice," at least to the adversary, can
easily be overemphasized,51 and jt is entirely permissible to con-
tend that the whole process of having the parties themselves state
the issues in controversy by written pleadings framed on their
own responsibility in advance of trial, has become archaic. Per-
haps it would be better if every case before trial had to be sub-
mitted to an official in the nature of a referee or master, to settle
and define the issues authoritatively for the parties and for the
trial court.52  It is pertinent to remark that such a system will
not have much value either, unless the right of amendment there-
after be strictly curtailed. But perhaps much might be hoped for
from a system of settling the issues in advance by an impartial
officer under judicial supervision and control, instead of leaving
them as we do, to be framed by counsel for the parties out of
court, at their own peril, and then trying to patch up the results
of their laziness or incompetence by free amendments in the midst
of the hurly-burly of trial. But be that as it may, the traditional
system is the one we have had and are supposed still to be work-
ing under in Minnesota, and it is urged once more that every
unnecessary widening of the scope of the denial is simply destruc-
tive of any value that may be thought still left in that system.
It is submitted that the parties had better not be relieved of their
responsibility for defining the issues until some better procedure
is substituted for It.5 3
5'Clark, Code Pleading 30.5 2Clark, Code Pleading 5, 6, 36.53It may be observed, that in certain actions the common law
gradually "debauched" the general issue till it covered virtually the whole
ground of validity and perhaps some defences by way of subsequent
discharge. But this evidently did not give satisfaction in practice, and
one of the chief accomplishments of the first reform of English pleading,
by the famous Hilary Rules, was to narrow again the scope of the general
issue and reinstate the affirmative defences. Cf. Finley v. Quirk, (1864)
9 Minn. 194, and Clark, Code Pleading 15.
